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Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Local Fiscal Discipline:
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Junxue Jia
Renmin University of China
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Renmin University of China
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Kewei Zhang
Boston University
Abstract
Using a nationwide city-level panel dataset for China for the years 1999-2009, this paper
examines the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) on local fiscal discipline, and
explicitly explores the institutional conditions under which these effects may take place. We
find that higher VFI levels induce fiscal indiscipline by reducing tax effort of local
governments. We exploit the unique Chinese fiscal institution of assigning taxing power for
local taxes and shared taxes to two separate authorities (i.e., the local tax bureau and the
central tax bureau, respectively) in several ways. We show that local governments respond to
the presence of the VFI by lowering their tax effort on local taxes, but do not do so for shared
taxes. In addition, we show that the (in)disciplining effect of the VFI is not present for
extra-budgetary revenues, which reflects the institutional fact that extra-budgetary revenues
are not considered for the determination of central fiscal transfers to local governments, thus
creating no incentive for local governments to respond in this area.
Keywords: Vertical fiscal imbalance; Local fiscal discipline; Common pool problem; Soft
budget constraint; China
JEL codes: H20; H71; H77
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1. Introduction
The past decades have witnessed wide implementation of fiscal decentralization reforms
in a vast number of developed and developing countries. The primary theoretical justification
for this movement is that fiscal decentralization is an effective tool for increasing the
economic efficiency of public expenditures in a variety of ways, including increased
competition among subnational governments in delivering public services (see, for example,
Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Qian and Roland, 1998).
Nevertheless, the theory supporting fiscal decentralization faces some criticism. In particular,
fiscal decentralization may distort the incentives of subnational governments if it is not well
designed. Based on the experience of many decentralized economies, the most common flaw
in design has been the mismatch between the devolution of expenditure responsibilities to
local governments and the assignment of devolved revenue sources to the same government
levels. That is, while many important spending responsibilities are decentralized to local
governments, the control of the major sources of revenues are retained and controlled by the
central government level. This asymmetry has been justified in different ways, including the
comparative advantage of central tax collection, the need to preserve macroeconomic stability,
or the objective of equalizing access to public services across all jurisdictions. However, it
also gives rise to what is known in the literature as the “vertical fiscal imbalance,” which
becomes itself a source of distortionary incentives, threatening to undo the same efficiency
gains associated with fiscal decentralization (Rodden et al., 2003; Bouton et al., 2008; Eyraud
and Lusinyan, 2013).1
Some level of vertical fiscal imbalance (hereafter: VFI) can be vital for the central
government to achieve certain political objectives (Dahlby, 1996; Boadway and Keen,
1996).2 Yet, a common concern in the literature is that high VFI levels and heavy reliance on
fiscal transfers may lead to local fiscal indiscipline in the form of overspending or lowering
local governments’ tax effort (e.g., Stein, 1999; Velasco, 2000; Borge and Rattso, 2002;
1

The existence of vertical fiscal imbalance implies that subnational governments have to rely on
intergovernmental transfers and borrowing in order to finance a large part of their expenditures.
2
For instance, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are good instruments to achieve redistribution objectives by
correcting horizontal fiscal imbalance across jurisdictions, or for helping address externality issues among
subnational jurisdictions via conditional grants.
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Rodden et al., 2003; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013). Two arguments pinpoint this concern. First,
in the presence of the VFI, while practically all benefits of public expenditure are obtained at
the local level, they are at least partly financed from a common pool of national resources,
implying that the perceived costs of public services at the local level are lower than the actual
costs. This, in turn, generates an overspending pressure demanding more central government
funds and/or a disincentive for taxing local sources of revenue since the relative price of this
financing source is relatively higher than that of grants (i.e., the common pool problem).
Second, high reliance on intergovernmental transfers or borrowing, as a consequence of the
presence of the VFI, “softens” the budget constraint of subnational governments, which may
induce bailout expectation by the central government, and, beyond over borrowing, may
possibly lead to strengthening strategic behaviors for overspending and/or lowering tax effort.
The existing empirical studies examining the relationship between the VFI and local
fiscal indiscipline focus largely on the side of public spending. Particularly, they test the
hypothesis that a high VFI level undermines fiscal discipline by motivating local
governments to further expand their expenditures (e.g., Ehdaie, 1994; Stein, 1999; Jin and
Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Jia et al., 2014). Additionally, a few studies analyze the link
between the VFI and the overall fiscal balance at the national level. For instance, using
cross-country panel datasets, both Rodden (2002) and Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) find
supporting evidence that higher VFI levels are detrimental to governments’ fiscal
performance and lead to increased fiscal deficits. De Mello (2000) also argues that the
presence of the VFI is likely to result in a deficit bias in decentralized policy-making,
especially in the case of developing countries, where the central government exercises less
stringent control on subnational finances. Despite these relevant works, little effort has been
explicitly devoted to identify the impact of the VFI on the other important side of local fiscal
indiscipline—local government taxing behaviors. In addition, the literature to date seems to
largely ignore the discussion on the institutional conditions under which the impact of the
VFI may actually take place. For instance, when there is no tax autonomy—in the sense of
not having the ability to change tax bases or rates—for local governments, the presence of the
VFI may not necessarily induce their behavioral response of lowering tax effort simply
because of its administrative infeasibility.
3

Our paper fills this gap and makes three main contributions to the current literature. First,
we are among the first to conduct an empirical examination of the impact of the VFI on local
government taxing behaviors. The extant literature, which mainly focuses on overspending
behaviors and overall fiscal performance of local governments, has little to say about whether
the VFI may induce another important form of fiscal indiscipline, by local governments
changing their level of tax effort. China offers a good case study to test this theoretical
argument, as the Chinese provincial governments have been granted substantial discretion in
determining their own fiscal decentralization policy towards sub-provincial governments
within their borders, which actually gives rise to a high level of variation in the VFI in
sub-provincial treatments. This variation is so substantial that it even outweighs that of fiscal
decentralization policies across European countries (Dollar and Hofman, 2008). Thus, a panel
study of city-level VFI in China presents the additional advantage of avoiding the potential
unobserved heterogeneity that may exist in the relevant cross-country studies of fiscal
decentralization.
Second, we explicitly explore the institutional conditions under which the impact of the
VFI on local government taxing behaviors may take place. We argue that local tax autonomy
and incentive compatibility are two important institutional factors shaping the effects of the
VFI on local government behaviors.3 Taking advantage of the unique feature of China’s
fiscal decentralization architecture, which assigns the tax administration of local taxes and
shared taxes to two separate tax bureaus (the local tax bureau and the central tax bureau,
respectively), 4 we validate the first institutional condition (i.e., local tax autonomy) by
hypothesizing that the only feasible way for local governments to make a strategic response
to the presence of high VFI is to change their taxing behaviors on local taxes (but not shared
taxes), which are under the direct administration of local governments. Next, we shed some
light on the second institutional condition (i.e., incentive compatibility) by analyzing the
taxing behaviors of local governments on extra-budgetary revenues. Since the
extra-budgetary revenues are outside the formal fiscal budgetary system in China, they are
3

In this paper, incentive compatibility refers to scenarios where the fiscal actions taken by local governments
are changed because they can directly affect the resources they receive from the central government. A typical
example of this and one that we highlight in this paper is that an increase in local fiscal capacity measured by
actual tax revenues collected may result in a reduction in fiscal transfers from the central governments.
4
See a more detailed discussion on China’s fiscal institutional framework in the next section.
4

not considered for the determination of central fiscal transfers to local governments. Thus,
our conjecture is that in the case of extra-budgetary revenues, local governments have no
incentive to respond to the presence of the VFI,5 which in turn provides an opportunity to
test the second hypothesized institutional condition.
Third and last, we explicitly address the endogeneity issue of VFI in the estimations by
employing an instrumental variable approach. From a technical perspective, a crucial yet
unsolved issue with the existing empirical literature on the impact of the VFI is that most
contributions fail to address the endogeneity of the VFI, or do so in a satisfactory manner. As
a consequence, it is far from clear in the past literature how to isolate the effect of the VFI
from other confounding factors and how to know whether the VFI is a cause or itself also an
effect of the policies and institutional changes in which we are interested (i.e., local
government taxing behaviors in our context). In this paper, we exploit the change in the
predicted school-age population as a potential instrument for the VFI. The rationale is that the
change in the predicted school-age population presents as an exogenous shock varying across
cities and over time to local public (education) expenditure, and thus, the VFI of the cities,
while this shock should not be directly affected by the taxing behaviors of local governments
or vice versa.
Using a nationwide city-level panel dataset for the years 1999-2009 and applying both
fixed effects and instrumental estimation strategies, we find strong support for our
conjectures. Specifically, we find the following. (i) Higher VFI levels reduce the ratio of total
fiscal revenues to gross domestic product (GDP) and the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP
significantly, 6 supporting the main argument that higher VFI levels may induce fiscal
indiscipline by reducing tax effort of local governments. (ii) While higher VFI levels reduce
the ratio of local taxes (and its main components, including urban infrastructure taxes and
agriculture taxes) to GDP significantly, its impact on the ratio of shared taxes (and its main
components, including value-added tax (VAT) and income taxes) to GDP is statistically
5

That is, using less extra-budgetary revenues will not affect the size the transfers received form upper level
governments.
6
Total fiscal revenues are composed of total tax revenues and total non-tax revenues. Total tax revenues are
revenues from local taxes and shared taxes elaborated in subsection 2.1. Total non-tax revenues include
administrative fees, penalty and confiscatory revenue, stated-owned assets operating revenue, and miscellaneous
non-tax revenues; but not transfers from the central government or any subnational borrowings, or any
extra-budgetary revenues.
5

insignificant. These results confirm the theoretical argument that local tax autonomy is a
necessary institutional condition for local governments to take strategic responses to the
presence of the VFI. In particular, under the current Chinese fiscal regime, only local taxes
are subject to the direct control of local governments, while shared taxes are collected and
regulated by the central tax bureau on behalf of the central government, which makes it
administratively very difficult to be affected by the presence of the VFI. 7 (iii) Higher VFI
levels have no impact on the ratio of extra-budgetary revenues to GDP, backing the
institutional condition of incentive compatibility through which the functioning mechanism
of the VFI may work. Finally, our results are shown to be robust across alternative
specifications and measures of the VFI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the fiscal institutions in
China. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical arguments on the potential impact of the VFI on
local government taxing behaviors, and derives the baseline hypotheses for empirical tests.
Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology, measurements of key variables, and the
dataset. Section 5 presents the main empirical results and robustness checks, and Section 6
concludes.

2. Institutional Background
An important feature of China’s vertical structure of government is the strong hierarchical
link between the different levels of government. Currently, there are five hierarchical levels
of government in China (Liu et al., 2015). Starting with the highest, these levels are the center,
provinces, prefecture-level cities, counties, and townships. During China’s transition from a
highly planned to a market economy since 1978, intergovernmental fiscal relations between
the central and local governments in China have experienced several major reforms. 8
However, these reforms have largely concentrated on the revenue side of the budgets, and

7

Local authorities may always try to influence the behaviors of central tax bureaus through the offer of local
housing and other benefits but in reality cannot have the kind of control they actually exert over local tax
bureaus. This finding provides support for De Mello’s (2000) claim that the loose control of the central
government for subnational finances triggers the VFI, inducing the fiscal indiscipline behaviors of local
governments.
8
Local governments, ranging from the provincial government all the way down to the township governments,
are broadly referred to as subnational governments.
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generally have not been coordinated with an explicit strategy for the reform of expenditure
assignments. 9 As such, much of the revenue assignment authority has been re-centralized at
the central level, while leaving the expenditure responsibilities largely decentralized at
different levels of local government. Below, we discuss the current tax-sharing system and its
implication for VFI in more detail.
2.1 The 1994 Tax-Sharing System Reform and the VFI
In 1994, the Chinese government implemented the tax-sharing system (TSS) reform,
classifying all taxes into three categories: central taxes, local taxes, and shared taxes between
the central and local governments. Mainly composed of the business tax, urban infrastructure
tax, and agriculture tax, local taxes are entirely retained by local governments, 10 while
revenues from the shared taxes are shared proportionally between the central government and
local governments. Specifically, the TSS reform defined the VAT being shared at a ratio of
75% (central) and 25% (local), and personal and corporate income taxes being shared at a
ratio of 60% (central) and 40% (local).11 The total tax revenues of local governments are
thus composed of local taxes and the local portion of the shared taxes.
Meanwhile, during the 1994 TSS reform separate central and local tax bureaus were
established at the provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels. The central tax bureaus
were put in charge of collecting central taxes 12 and the majority of the shared taxes,13 while
the local tax bureaus were made mainly responsible for the collection of all local taxes and the
remaining small portion of the shared taxes. The shared taxes are under the direct supervision
9

There has been no apparent change in either the policy framework or the practice of expenditure assignments
between the central government and sub-national governments or among the sub-provincial governments since
even before the start of the market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s (Liu et al., 2015).
10
A complete list of local taxes includes: the business tax and urban infrastructure tax (other than the tax on the
headquarters of banks, insurance companies, and rail transportation), urban land use tax, farmland occupation tax,
VAT on land, contract tax, motor-vehicle and ship use tax, agriculture tax, tax on agricultural products, livestock
tax, livestock slaughter tax, and the farmland conversion tax. It is notable that the agriculture tax, tax on
agricultural products, livestock tax, and livestock slaughter tax were abolished in 2006.
11
The sharing ratio for the personal and the corporate income taxes was 50:50 (central:local) in 2002 and was
rescheduled to 60:40 (central:local) in 2003.
12
Central taxes include the tariff and tonnage tax, the consumption tax and value-added tax (VAT) levied by the
customs department, vehicle purchase tax, business tax, income tax, and urban infrastructure tax collected from
rail transportation, state post, state-owned commercial banks, and head office of insurance companies.
13
Recall that the shared taxes include the VAT, corporate income tax, and personal income tax. Personal
income tax, which accounts for approximately 6% of total tax revenues in China, is collected by the local tax
bureau but it is under the strict supervision of the central government. Additionally, for those firms that were not
affiliated to the central government and were established before 2002, their corporate income taxes were
collected by local tax bureau. Later on in subsection 5.3, we take advantage of this special setup to check the
robustness of our results.
7

of the central government, and largely, local governments have no practical influence on the
collection effort of shared taxes. On the contrary, local taxes, which are collected and
administrated at some discretion of local governments, form an important source of revenue
for local governments. Even though local governments have little authority to change the
statutory rates of the local taxes, 14 they have considerable scope to manipulate their tax
enforcement to change the actual taxes being collected (see, for example, Liu and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2014).
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the 1994 TSS reform only explicitly stipulates the
tax sharing rules between the central government and provincial governments, leaving space
for the provincial governments to specify their own sharing rules for their retained revenues
at the sub-provincial level. In practice, the business tax, the resource tax, and the retained
shared taxes (including 25% of total VAT and 40% of total income tax) are usually shared in a
ratio of 50:50 (provincial:sub-provincial) or other ad hoc negotiation ratios across
provinces,15 while sub-provincial governments are generally allowed to retain 100% of the
urban infrastructure tax and the agriculture tax.16
By setting the VAT and income taxes as shared taxes, and assigning the central
government with the largest share of these major tax instruments, the 1994 TSS reform
successfully recentralized revenues to the central level and met the twin reform objectives of
raising the central government’s revenues and strengthening the control of the central
government over the fiscal system. Immediately after the TSS reform, the share of total fiscal
revenues assigned to the central government increased from 22.0% in 1993 to 55.7% in 1994
and has remained at around 52.0% since then (Jia et al., 2014). Nevertheless, as pointed out
above, expenditure assignments at the different levels of government today are largely what
they were decades ago, which assigned sub-national governments (especially city and county
governments) with, what may be considered by international norms, excessive expenditure
responsibilities. Consequently, the TSS reform started a period of severe VFI for the Chinese
local governments, especially for prefecture-level city governments. Figure 1 illustrates the
14

For some local taxes, for instance the business taxes for certain sectors, local governments are allowed to
select a particular tax rate from a given range of tax rates set by the central authority.
15
For example, the sub-provincial governments in Jiangsu Province were allowed to retain 50% of the
provincial share of VAT in 2000, as compared to 80% in Hunan Province (Jia et al., 2014).
16
See Li (2010) for a comprehensive description of the sub-provincial fiscal system in China.
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general tendency of the VFI at the city level for the sample period of 1999-2009.17 As shown,
the average revenue size of city governments in the sample, denoted by the ratio of total
fiscal revenues to GDP, is relatively stable at around 5%, experiencing only a slight increase
after 2006. By contrast, the average expenditure size of city governments—the ratio of total
fiscal expenditure to GDP—has increased continuously, from 9.4% in 1999 to 19.8% in 2009.
This gap in revenue and expenditure assignments has contributed to a continuous increase in
the VFI over the years.
(Insert Fig. 1 Here)
Largely, fiscal transfers from the central government have worked to compensate for the
rising VFI shown in Figure 1.18 Our data show that, in 1999, 39.7% of city government
expenditures on average were financed through intergovernmental transfers and other
resources. Further, this ratio rose to 58.1% in 2009.

2.2 Extra-Budgetary Revenue as a Source of Local Revenue
The 1994 TSS reform clearly defined the (budgetary) fiscal revenues for local
governments, which are composed of tax revenues and non-tax revenues.19 It also, for the
first time in China, introduced rules-based intergovernmental fiscal transfer programs with
the objective of accommodating gaps in fiscal capacity and expenditure needs across local
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the recentralization of revenue assignments after the 1994 reform
and the weakness of revenue bases have led local governments to search for more sources of
revenue outside the budget system, mainly in the form of extra-budgetary revenues (see, for
example, Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014; Han and Kung, 2015).
The VFI is defined as the share of a city’s own spending not financed through own revenues (i.e., the
difference between a city’s own spending and own revenues) to its own spending. By definition and in
correspondence to the Chinese fiscal institutions, a city’s own spending equals to the city’s total fiscal
expenditure, while its own revenues equal its total fiscal revenues. The counterparts of VFI are mainly transfers
received from the upper-level governments and other deficit financing. For more detailed discussion of its
measure, see subsection 4.2.2.
18
Under the current setting, fiscal transfers from the central government to local governments can be
categorized into tax rebates, equalization transfers, and ad hoc transfers. While the first two items are
formula-based, the ad hoc grants (also known as earmarked grants) are program-based and allocated for special
purposes such as emergency funding for natural catastrophes. See Liu et al. (2014) for a more detailed
discussion on fiscal transfers in China.
19
Tax revenues are revenues from local taxes and shared taxes elaborated in subsection 2.1. Non-tax revenues
include administrative fees, penalty and confiscatory revenue, stated-owned assets operating revenue, and
miscellaneous non-tax revenues.
17
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Extra-budgetary revenues largely come from tax surcharges, land conveyance fees, and
sometimes “illegal” fees, in the sense that they are not authorized by the central or provincial
government levels. Unlike budgetary revenue, which is subject to the TSS rules,
extra-budgetary revenues are wholly controlled by local governments and are not included in
the formal budget. In addition, local governments have complete authority over deciding
which fees and funds should be allocated to the extra budget (Montinola et al., 1995). Figure
2 provides an overview of the quantitative importance of extra-budgetary revenues at the
prefecture-city level in China. As shown, extra-budgetary revenues of city governments grew
from less than 0.23% of GDP (i.e., 17.03 billion RMB) in 1999 to about 2.91% of GDP (i.e.,
957.69 billion RMB) in 2009.
(Insert Fig. 2 Here)

3. Theoretical Review and Basic Hypotheses
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism often emphasizes that fiscal decentralization
coupled with large VFI may undermine the fiscal discipline of local governments in
decentralized economies. In particular, two theoretical constructs, the common pool problem
and soft budget constraint, explain how the presence of VFI may affect local government
fiscal behaviors. The common pool problem originates from the well-known theory of “the
tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Weingast et al. (1981) extend it to the fiscal
framework and reach an important implication, namely that governments having access to
common pool resources would fail to internalize the full cost of public expenditures that
benefit their own jurisdictions. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the central
government are usually deemed as a typical type of common pool resource in a partial
decentralized fiscal system, where the central government collects the majority of total
revenues and finances local expenditures using transfers (Stein, 1999). 20 When fiscal

20

In a multilevel government framework, when local governments have full revenue autonomy and the
authority to make policies, the tax bases shared by the central and local governments also create a common pool
problem. This is so because the existence of vertical tax competition between the central and local governments
tends to result in an inefficient high local tax rate, given that local governments generally ignore the vertical
externality generated by their own tax decisions (e.g., Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002; Brülhart and Jametti, 2006;
Devereux et al., 2008; Berry, 2008). Nevertheless, the shared taxes in China are under the direct control of the
central government, and therefore, the associated common pool problem is not relevant in our context.
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transfers fill up the VFI, the perceived costs of public services at the local level become lower
than the actual costs. At the same time, this creates a wedge in the perceived marginal costs in
raising funds from own revenue sources and intergovernmental transfers (with the perceived
marginal cost of own taxation being larger than the perceived marginal cost of funds from
inter-governmental transfers). Thus, local governments face the incentive(s) to expand their
public expenditures and/or lower their costly tax effort on own source revenues, thus shifting
part of their cost of expenditures to other jurisdictions through the intergovernmental fiscal
transfers system (e.g., Stein, 1999; Velasco, 2000; Rodden et al., 2003). The larger the VFI,
the more severe the common pool problem becomes.
The literature on soft budget constraint also provides consistent implications for the
indisciplining effects of the VFI. It argues that the existence of large VFI with transfer
dependence may soften local governments’ budget constraints because it creates expectations
of potential bailouts for local governments. Specifically, because of local governments’
limited ability in raising revenues in the event of a financial crisis, local voters and creditors
may find it difficult to fault local governments and feel compelled to believe that it would be
the central government’s responsibility to solve the crisis. Thus, such expectations deteriorate
local fiscal discipline and aggravate the common pool problem among local governments
(Von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996; Qian and Roland, 1998; Pisauro, 2003; Rodden et al.,
2003). This problem perhaps is exacerbated in the Chinese context because of the role of the
central government in the political system. Historically, the Chinese Community Party and
the State’s primary task has been to preserve local social political order and stability, which
essentially prevents the central government from making a credible commitment not to bail
out those local governments in a financial crisis. Thus, the central government is bound to
pay a price to ensure that functional local governments maintain political order and social
stability, and this price manifests itself in the form of a growing number of transfers, some of
which occur at a massive scale, consequently leading to local fiscal indiscipline (Guo, 2008).
Given that our primary focus is on the revenue disciplining effect of the VFI, we
encapsulate the prediction of the theoretical framework into the following testable Hypothesis

11

1:21

Hypothesis 1: Higher VFI levels undermine local fiscal discipline by discouraging local
tax effort.

Even though this classic view provides valuable insights into the disciplining effect of the
VFI, it does not mean that the implicit functioning mechanism of the VFI will work under
any conditions. A closer look at this point reveals two necessary (institutional) conditions.
The first essential premise, which is somehow straightforward, is that local governments are
capable to respond freely to the changes in local fiscal conditions (for instance, the presence
of the VFI). In other words, local governments should enjoy at least certain degree of tax
autonomy so they can influence their tax collections. Despite its importance, none of the
studies in the previous literature explicitly identifies the role of local tax autonomy in shaping
the disciplining effect of local governments in response to the presence of the VFI.
As elaborated previously in subsection 2.1, the TSS reform in China has assigned local
taxes and shared taxes to two separate tax bureaus, with local taxes being collected and
administrated by local governments, and shared taxes by the central tax bureau on behalf of
the central government. This unique institutional setup in China provides us with an
opportunity to test the local tax autonomy condition by hypothesizing that the only feasible
way for local governments to lower local revenue collection is to change their tax effort on
local taxes and not so for shared taxes. This prediction is summarized in testable Hypothesis
2:

Hypothesis 2: Higher VFI levels undermine local fiscal discipline by discouraging local
tax collection but not so for shared taxes.

21

The literature on tax competition contains an argument that the presence of equalization transfers in
decentralized economies may potentially serve as a corrective device for harmful inter-jurisdictional tax
competition and thus mitigate the “race to the bottom” competition in tax rates (see, for example, Egger et al.,
2010; Liu, 2014). However, this is less likely to be an important concern in the Chinese context largely because
of the limited amount of equalization transfers in the total transfers of the system, especially in the early years.
We also deal with this concern by excluding the equalization transfers from the measure of the VFI. The results
are largely unchanged.
12

The second condition, which is perhaps less straightforward and which we call the
incentive compatibility condition, is that some changes in local fiscal behaviors will directly
affect the central policy toward local governments and therefore that will affect how local
government actually behave. In the spirit of both the common pool and soft budget constraint
theories, local governments may lower their costly tax enforcement either because they
anticipate an offsetting compensation in the form of central transfers or simply a bailout from
the central government. Thus, in the presence of institutions that effectively disconnect the
link between local fiscal behaviors and central policies, we should expect a break in the
functioning mechanism powered by the VFI.
In the Chinese context, extra-budgetary revenues are not only under the full discretion of
local governments, but they are also outside the fiscal budgetary system. This means that
extra-budgetary revenues actually are not considered when determining the amounts of fiscal
transfers to be received by local governments. This implies the lack of a direct linkage
between local performance regarding extra-budgetary revenues and the central policy.22 Thus,
straightforward logic follows that local governments should have no incentive to change their
collecting (taxing) behaviors for extra-budgetary revenues regardless of the VFI level faced
by the localities. This unique fiscal regime, thus, has profound policy implications and
provides a good opportunity for conducting a placebo test to check the incentive
compatibility condition for the functioning mechanism of the VFI. A confirmation of our
main question of interest would predict an insignificant effect of the VFI on the collection of
extra-budgetary revenues. We summarize the same in Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 3: Higher VFI levels should have no impact on local collection effort of
extra-budgetary revenues.
22

Although a few studies argue that the steady increase in extra-budgetary revenues is partially due to the
heavy expenditure pressure (e.g., Fan, 1996; Jin et al., 2005), the use of extra-budgetary revenues to supplement
budgetary revenues is indeed rather limited. The institutional changes in the past decade have put
extra-budgetary revenues under strict supervision. For instance, the “tax-for-fee” reform in the late 1990s
converted various extra-budgetary fees into budgetary revenues. Meanwhile, the “two distinct avenues of
revenue collection and spending” (shouzhi liangtiao xian) reform in 1999 are of great significance in that they
put extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures under increasing scrutiny; they explicitly stipulate that the use of
extra-budgetary revenues should be subject to regulatory mandates. Thus, clear management of the
extra-budgetary accounting system implies that the growth of extra-budgetary revenues neither contributes to
the expansion of budgetary expenditures nor the filling up of the budgetary fiscal gaps.
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4. Econometric Methodology, Measurement of Key Variables, and Data
4.1. Econometric Methodology
4.1.1. Baseline Specification
In this section, we discuss the empirical specification with the objective of testing
Hypotheses 1-3. Specifically, to assess the impacts of the VFI on local revenue indiscipline,
we estimate a standard two-way fixed effects model of the form
𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑝𝑡 𝛿 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑝𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑝𝑡

(1)

where i represents a prefecture-level city, p represents the home province of city i, and t
denotes the year. The dependent variable 𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 is a series of indicators capturing local fiscal
discipline on the side of taxing behaviors; 𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 is the measurement of the vertical fiscal
imbalance of a city;23 𝑿𝑖,𝑝𝑡 represents a set of control variables, including real GDP per
capita, the shares of the secondary and tertiary sectors in GDP, population density,
government size, cultivation land per capita, FDI, the length of highways, total numbers of
passengers, number of cities in a province, number of counties in a city, a dummy variable
for the rural tax-for-fee (RTF) reform, and a series of characteristics of the city party
secretary. To capture the potential heterogeneous time patterns of the outcome variables
across the provinces, we control for a full set of province-year fixed effects (denoted by 𝑢𝑝𝑡 ).
Furthermore, the model includes city dummies (𝜂𝑖 ) to control for unobserved heterogeneity
that are constant over time across cities as well as year dummies (𝜈𝑡 ) to control for year
effects that affect all cities; 𝜀𝑖,𝑝𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term.
As control variables, real GDP per capita, the shares of the secondary and tertiary sectors
in GDP, and cultivation land per capita capture the general effects of economic development
and economic structure on local revenue policy. Population density and the number of
counties in a city are employed to capture the possible scale effects in the collection of local
revenues. Government size, measured by the ratio of fiscally supported population
(consisting of civil servants and employees in public service sectors) to the city’s total
population, is included to account for the revenue need of the government. The length of
23

See the next subsection for detailed definitions for both 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑡 and 𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑡 .
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highways and the number of total annual passengers can be interpreted as a proxy for the
quality of city infrastructure. The number of cities in a province captures the potential effect
of inter-jurisdictional competition on local revenue collection. We also control for a dummy
variable of the RTF reform in rural China aiming to control for the potential influence of the
reform on local revenue policy. 24 To further isolate the impact of political promotion
incentives on local taxing behaviors, we additionally control for a series of characteristics of
the city secretary, including his/her age, education, and a dummy variable indicating whether
he/she is an ethnic minority.
4.1.2. Instrumental Variable Estimations
A potential concern is that the endogeneity of the VFI may bias the estimates in our
baseline regressions. In theory, this issue may arise because of reverse causality, omitted
variable bias, and measurement errors. In our particular context, the reverse causality is likely
to emerge for two primary reasons. First, since the VFI is measured by the ratio of the
difference between city total fiscal expenditures and revenues to its total fiscal expenditures,
any change in city revenue collection will have a mechanical effect on the VFI through the
accounting relationship. Second, intergovernmental transfers from the central government are
usually responsive to city governments’ fiscal performance, especially their revenue
capacities. Thus, local expenditures financed by the intergovernmental transfers are
intrinsically connected to city revenue collection. Besides reverse causality, the endogeneity
may well be rooting in the potential measurement errors of the VFI, which, as discussed in
subsection 4.2.2, might be captured by different dimensions, and which, by nature is difficult
to be measured accurately with limited data information.
To circumvent the endogeneity issue and identify the causal impact of the VFI on local
fiscal discipline, we use an instrumental variable estimation. Specifically, we use as an
instrument the change in predicted school-age population (0-14 years old) between two
consecutive years. The predicted school-age population (𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑝𝑡 ) is calculated by using
the actual school-age population in 1999 as the base and assuming an exponential growth
24

There may be a concern that this dummy variable may not be able to capture the heterogeneous effects of the
reform across cities. As a robustness check, we replace it with the ratio of the RTF reform subsidies to total
local government expenditures and re-estimate the model. The RTF reform subsidy is made by the central
government for compensating the revenue losses of local governments in the post-RFT reform period. The
results are largely unchanged. These results are not reported but available from the authors.
15

over years, that is
̂ 𝑖,𝑝𝑗 )𝑡−1999 , 𝑡 = 2000,2001, … ,2009
𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑝𝑡 = 𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑝1999 × (1 + 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑔𝑟
where 𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑝1999 is the actual school-age population for city i in province p in year 1999,
̂ 𝑖,𝑝𝑗 is the simulated natural population growth rate for city i in province p in
and 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑔𝑟
year j.25 To ensure the exogeneity of the population growth rate for city i in the calculation
of the instrument, we do not use the actual natural population growth rate for city i, but
̂ 𝑖,𝑝𝑗 ) as the weighted average of the actual population
instead we construct it (i.e., 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑔𝑟
growth rate for all other cities (except city i itself) in the same province. 26
The validity of the instrument can be justified as follows. Given that the primary concern
of the endogeneity of the VFI concerns the reverse causality between local revenue collection
and the VFI, our strategy is to search for instruments with some exogenous variations that
may explain local expenditures but not local revenue collection. School-age population falls
in this range. As we previously noted, China has maintained a rather decentralized system in
terms of expenditure assignments, with local governments providing the majority of essential
public services, especially (compulsory) elementary and middle school education. In
particular, the share of education expenditure in total local government expenditure is around
20% on average in our sample for the period between 1999 and 2009 at the prefecture-city
level. Additionally, the 1995 “Education Law of the People’s Republic of China” explicitly
stipulates that the growth rate of education expenditure should exceed the growth rate of
government revenues, and per student budgetary education expenditure should increase
annually (Article 55).27 These institutional facts suggest a high correlation between local
public education expenditure and the VFI. Since school-age population is a major predictor
for the demand and increase in basic education, but not directly for local revenue collection,
this justifies the use of school-age population as an arguably good candidate for
25

The predicted school-age population in 1998 is calculated as SAP𝑖,𝑝1999 ×

1
.
̂
1+𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑔𝑟
𝑖,𝑝1999

It is also noted that

annual data on actual population age structure are not available at the sub-provincial level. The most
comprehensive and authoritative data on population age structure can be sourced from the population census
conducted by the central government every five years since 1990.
26
The weight is total population of the city. The argument here is that the population growth rate in city i is
correlated with the population growth rate in other cities in the same province.
27
The requirement that the ratio of education expenditures to GDP should be higher than 4% is often regarded
as a political objective for local governments in China.
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instrumenting local expenditures, and thereby, the VFI.
Using change in the predicted values of school-age population as an instrument presents
two additional benefits. First, by its construction, the simulated natural population growth
rate is almost certain to be exogenous to factors that may affect local government revenue
behaviors, and hence, using the predicted values of school-age population, largely reduces the
risk of potential endogeneity. Second, since the VFI is measured as the degree of divergence
between total fiscal expenditures and total fiscal revenues, which potentially captures the
change in expenditure needs due to the external shocks; thus the change in the predicted
values tends to better explain the degree of such divergence than the stock values do. In
summary, the change in predicted school-age population represents an exogenous shock to
the change in local public expenditure (and not so the change in own revenues), and thus acts
as a valid instrument for the VFI. 28
4.2. Measures of Key Variables
4.2.1. Local Fiscal Discipline
As we have stressed previously, our primary focus is on the local fiscal discipline in terms
of taxing behaviors (𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 ); thus, the first task is to come up with a comparable measure of
𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 to use as a dependent variable. Recall that Hypothesis 1 predicts a crowding out effect of
the VFI on local revenue collection (i.e., tax effort). Thus, we follow the conventional
empirical literature to measure 𝐼𝑖,𝑝𝑡 in a straightforward way, as both the ratio of total fiscal
revenues to GDP and the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP of a city.29 Other factors being
equal, cities with larger values of these ratios should stand for higher levels of revenue/tax
collection effort, and thus, stronger fiscal discipline.
Following the same logic, we employ the ratio of local taxes to GDP and the ratio of
shared taxes to GDP as dependent variables to test Hypothesis 2 for uncovering the local tax
autonomy condition under which the impact of the VFI functions. As robustness checks, we
also utilize the ratios of individual components for both local taxes (including business taxes,
urban infrastructure taxes, and agriculture taxes) and shared taxes (including the VAT and
28

In subsection 5.2, we perform formal tests to check the validity of the instrument.
Recall that total fiscal revenues include both tax revenues and non-tax revenues. Tax revenues are revenues
from local taxes and shared taxes elaborated in subsection 2.1. Non-tax revenues include administrative fee,
penalty and confiscatory revenue, stated-owned assets operating revenue, and miscellaneous non-tax revenues.
29
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income taxes) to GDP as dependent variables to re-conduct the analysis.
Lastly, for conducting the placebo analysis and providing evidence for the incentive
compatibility condition as summarized in Hypothesis 3, we employ the ratios of both the
overall and the specific components of extra-budgetary revenues to GDP as the dependent
variables.
4.2.2. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
Different measures of the VFI have been used in the literature. For instance, Boadway
and Trembly (2006) theoretically define it as the level of deviation from the optimal vertical
fiscal gap, while most empirical studies use “transfer dependency”, calculated as the share of
intergovernmental transfers in total local expenditures (or total local revenues), as a proxy
(e.g., De Mello, 2000; Bird and Smart, 2002; Rodden, 2002). Essentially, the VFI represents
the degree of mismatch between local governments’ expenditures and their own source
revenues. Intergovernmental transfers, as well as some additional revenues such as local
borrowings and other deficit financing usually fill the gap. Thus, the transfer dependency
indicator may not be an accurate measure of the VFI in this regard.
In this paper, we follow Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) and Jia et al. (2014) to measure the
VFI as the share of a city’s own spending not financed through own revenues (i.e., the
difference between a city’s own spending and own revenues) to its own spending. By
definition and in correspondence to the Chinese fiscal institutions, a city’s own spending
equals to the city’s total fiscal expenditure, while its own revenues equal its total fiscal
revenues. 30 As previously pointed out, the gap between a city’s total fiscal expenditure and
revenues is mainly filled by transfers received from the upper-level governments and budget
deficits (even though such deficits are not legally allowed by the central authority). As shown
in Figure 1, city governments in China evolved a severe mismatch between expenditure
responsibilities and their revenue capacities from 1999 to 2009, with an average VFI of
51.21% during this period (see Table 1).
Table A in the Appendix provides a detailed description and sources of all the variables,
while their summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
Recall that a city’s total fiscal revenues are composed of total tax revenues (i.e., sum of local taxes and city
portion of the shared taxes) and total non-tax revenues, but not including any transfers from upper-level
governments.
30
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(Insert Table 1 Here)
4.3. Data
The panel dataset we use for the quantitative analysis covers 325 prefecture-level cities in
China for the years 1999-2009. We exclude the four province-level municipality cities,
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing, as the legal status of these municipalities is
non-comparable to other regular cities. Cities in Tibet are also excluded from the sample
because of data unavailability. Since data on some of the key variables such as personal
income taxes and corporate income taxes are only available from 1999, we select 1999 as the
starting period in our analysis; the end year of the panel dataset, 2009, is the last year that
disaggregated fiscal data at the sub-provincial level were released.
Data used for the calculations of the key variables are taken from the Prefecture, City, and
County Public Finance Statistics (Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao, 2000-2010.
This is the most detailed and disaggregated data source on subnational public finances and
some basic economic and socio-economic variables (such as GDP, shares of secondary and
tertiary sectors in GDP, and fiscally supported population, etc.). Data on the natural
population growth rate, FDI, the length of highways, and total number of passengers, are
collected from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2000-2010). Information on population in school age (i.e.,
0-14 years old) in 1999 is obtained from the Provincial Tabulation on the 2000 Population
Census (National Bureau of Statistics, 2001) for each province. The city party secretaries’
background information is obtained from their curriculum vitae, which is publicly available
online.

5. Empirical Results
5.1. Fixed Effects Results
The estimation results from the fixed effects regressions of the disciplining effects of the
VFI are presented in Table 2. Columns (1)-(3) and Columns (4)-(6) alternatively use the ratio
of total fiscal revenues to GDP and the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP as the dependent
variables. The table presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors with different
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sets of control variables. In all estimations, we include city fixed effects, year dummies, and
the full set of province-year dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity and specific
province-time fixed effects.
To begin with, we examine the effect of the VFI on local fiscal discipline without adding
any other explanatory variables to the model. As shown in Column (1) of Table 2, the
coefficient of the VFI is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, supporting
Hypothesis 1 that the presence of the VFI reduces local revenues collection. Our main result
persists if we use the alternative dependent variable (Column 4). We then continuously add to
the model with a rich set of economic explanatory variables and city leader’s characteristics
in Columns (2)-(3) and Columns (5)-(6), respectively. Again, we find a negative impact of the
VFI on local fiscal discipline on the side of revenue collection, independently of the use of
alternative dependent variables. The magnitudes of the coefficients vary across alternative
dependent variables and model specifications and range from -0.121 to -0.033. Specifically,
based on our preferred specifications, with multiple variables controlled, the estimate of the
VFI in Column (3) (Column (6)) is -0.121 (-0.033), indicating that a one-percentage point
increase in the VFI is associated with a reduction of the share of total fiscal revenues (total
tax revenues) in GDP by 0.121 (0.033) percentage points. At the mean values, this translates
into an equivalent reduction of 2.33% (0.87%) in GDP (i.e., 0.121/5.19 (0.033/3.80) in the
share of total fiscal revenues (total tax revenues). 31 In addition, the magnitudes of the
estimated coefficients also reveal that the quantitative impacts of the VFI tend to be larger
when the share of total fiscal revenues in GDP is used as the dependent variable, which in
turn is consistent with the fact that total fiscal revenues are a broader concept than total tax
revenues, thus implying a larger scope for strategic responses.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
5.2. Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
From a technical perspective, a valid instrument needs to meet both the relevance and
exogenous conditions. Here, before we present the instrumental variable (IV) estimation
results, we provide some evidence that these two conditions are indeed satisfied with the

31

Mean values are shown in Table 1.
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selected instrument. To start with, Table 3 reports the first-stage estimation results in the
instrumental variable estimations. We find that the instrument (i.e., the change in predicted
school-age population) is positively and significantly correlated with the VFI, confirming our
argument for the relevance of using school-age population as an effective predictor for local
expenditures, and thus, the VFI. Meanwhile, for all specifications, the F-statistic is always
over 10, suggesting that our IV estimates are not prone to the weak instrument concern. Next,
we check for the exogenous condition, which means that the instrument should have affected
the local government taxing behaviors only through its impact on the VFI. To validate this,
we include the instrument as an additional explanatory variable to the baseline specification
(1) and anticipate an insignificant result of it in this augmented specification; otherwise, it
would indicate that the instrument does have other channels to influence local taxing
behaviors after controlling for its impact on VFI. Table 4 reports the results for the augmented
specification. There we find the estimates of the instrument to be consistently insignificant
across different specifications. Taken all together, it significantly increases our confidence of
the validity of the instrument.
(Insert Tables 3 & 4 Here)
The IV estimation results are presented in Table 5. They clearly show that VFI, after
being instrumented, still has a negative and statistically significant impact on local fiscal
discipline on taxing behavior, which further supports Hypothesis 1. In our preferred IV
specifications of Column (3) in Table 5, the coefficient of the VFI is -0.106. Hence, a
one-percentage point increase in the VFI tends to result in a decrease of 0.106 percentage
points in the share of total fiscal revenues to GDP. When we use the ratio of total tax
revenues to GDP as the dependent variable, the coefficients of the VFI in all specifications
(i.e., Columns (4) to (6)) echo our findings in Table 2: the indisciplining effect of the VFI on
local revenue collection is independent of the use of alternative dependent variables.
(Insert Table 5 Here)
5.3. Exploring the Institutional Conditions
5.3.1 The Importance of Local Tax Autonomy
Having obtained strong empirical support for Hypothesis 1, we now proceed to test
Hypothesis 2 for the heterogeneous effects of the VFI on different sources of revenue (mainly
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local taxes versus shared taxes), and also as a way to validate the condition of local tax
autonomy under which the impact of the VFI will take place. As discussed in some details in
Section 3, our identification strategy is based on the insight that subject to the management of
different taxing authorities, the collection of local taxes and shared taxes might be influenced
differently by local governments’ taxing behaviors. While the collection of local taxes is
somehow at the discretion of local governments, and thus might be vulnerable to the changes
in incentive faced by local governments, the collection of shared taxes is under the direct and
strict control of the central government, and thus might not be sensitive to the presence of the
VFI at the local level. To shed some light on this, we extend our analysis by decomposing
total tax revenues into two main categories: revenues from local taxes and revenues from the
local portion of shared taxes. We then re-estimate the effects of the VFI. Given the limits on
space, we report only the IV estimation results of the subsequent analysis.
Tables 6 and 7 document the results for the use of the ratio of local taxes (along with its
main individual tax categories including business taxes, urban infrastructure taxes, and
agriculture taxes) to GDP, and the ratio of shared taxes (along with its main individual tax
categories, including the VAT and corporate income taxes) to GDP as the dependent variables,
respectively. As shown in Table 6, regardless of the use of aggregated local taxes or
individual local taxes as the dependent variable, the coefficients of the VFI are consistently
negative in all four specifications, supporting the first part of Hypothesis 2 that city
governments respond to the VFI by reducing their taxing effort on local taxes. However, we
note that even though the estimate of the VFI is negative, it is not statistically significant
when the ratio of business taxes to GDP is used as the dependent variable. This is not surprise
though. As we have already mentioned in subsection 2.1, even though the business tax is a
type of local tax collected by local tax bureaus, it is commonly shared between provincial
governments and sub-provincial governments (including cities, counties, and townships) at
certain ratios varying across provinces. Thus, local collection of business tax may be still
under full scrutiny by the upper level authorities (i.e., the provincial governments) because
they also share in the tax. To give an example of how the scrutiny takes place, provincial
governments frequently set up annual tax planning targets for their subordinated governments
regarding shared taxes, leaving little room for prefecture-city governments to manipulate
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their taxing behavior in the case of the business tax.32 Consequently, even though local tax
bureaus collect the business tax, prefecture-city level governments actually have very little
tax autonomy on this tax.
Quantitatively, the VFI appears to have the largest impact on the collection of agricultural
taxes. This result may be because the agriculture sector represents the hardest to tax sector in
the economy, and given the rising opposition among famers to the many diverse local charges
in rural China in the period examined, local governments have had more leeway to change
their taxing behaviors for the agriculture sector in the presence of the VFI.
(Insert Table 6 Here)
Table 7 provides strong evidence for the second part of Hypothesis 2. As predicted, the
VFI turns out to have no significant impact on the collection of either aggregate shared taxes
or its main components, including the VAT and income taxes. Moreover, the results do not
show either any discernible pattern for the effect of the VFI on different types of shared taxes,
where we observe a negative estimate for the VAT and a positive estimate for income taxes.
While, in general, the insignificant findings for the shared taxes are in line with our
theoretical prediction, we have to be caution when interpreting the results for corporate
income tax. This is so because the tax collection power for corporate income tax has only
been shifted from local tax bureaus to central tax bureaus in 2002, a result of the important
income tax reform in that year. More specifically, the reform stated that firms established on
and after 2002 are assigned to central tax bureaus for corporate income tax collection, while
firms established before 2002 remain the task of local tax bureau for corporate income tax
collection. This implies that our estimations in Table 7 based on aggregated data will not be
able to capture this confounding factor. To further investigate this point, we rely on firm-level
data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China 33 for the period (i.e., 1999-2007) to identify whether the firms were
32

As a matter of fact, some of the business tax revenues are shared between local governments and the central
governments. For instance, 37.5% of business tax from the financial and insurance sectors belongs to the central
government, while the rest is shared among different levels of sub-provincial governments.
33
This dataset has been widely used in the literature (for example, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Guariglia et al.,
2011; Brandt et al., 2012; Feenstra et al., 2014). The dataset includes all industrial firms that are either
state-owned, or non-state firms with sales above 5 million RMB. The industrial firms operate in mining,
manufacturing, and public utility sectors, spanning 31 provinces and province-equivalent municipal cities. We
follow the method proposed by Brandt et al. (2012) to clean the dataset. On average, nearly 220,000 firms per
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established before or after 2002. Then we calculate separate indexes of effective corporate tax
rates for these two groups of firms (which were under supervision of local tax bureau and
central tax bureau, respectively) at the city-year level. Finally, we perform separate
estimations by using the aggregated effective corporate tax rate at the city level for firms
established before and after 2002 as alternative dependent variables.34 The results in columns
(4) and (5) of Table 7 show that while the estimates of VFI are negative in both cases, they
are only statistically significant (at the margin) for the former case, where the effective tax
rates for firms established before 2002 (and so under the control of local tax bureau) are used
as the dependent variable. These additional results largely support our main argument that
local governments will be able to response to the presence of VFI only when they are
provided with certain taxing powers.
(Insert Table 7 Here)
In sum, our analysis validates Hypothesis 2 and confirms the hypothesized condition that
local governments lessen their fiscal discipline behaviors by reducing their taxing effort on
local taxes in China. This finding highlights the importance of tax autonomy for
understanding the effect of the VFI.
5.3.2 Incentive Compatibility and Placebo Test
In a way, the previous results regarding the shared taxes can be treated as a placebo test
for the main hypothesis of the paper (i.e., Hypothesis 1), as the shared taxes are not controlled
by local governments. In this subsection, we present another placebo test to our main
argument by analyzing extra-budgetary revenues, which is an incentive-incompatible element
as it does not enter the budgetary system and is not considered in the determination of
intergovernmental transfers for local governments. That is, fiscal transfers from the central
government will not compensate the lowering collections of extra-budgetary revenues, as the
allocation of fiscal transfers is solely based on budgetary fiscal performance of local
governments. Thus, we may expect to see no significant impact of the VFI on the
year for the period from 1999 to 2007 are included in the dataset. The dataset contains basic information on
firms’ operation statement including income tax payable and earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), which
enables us to compute the effective corporate income tax rate for the firms.
34
Effective corporate tax rate faced by the firms is defined as the ratio of income tax payable to earnings before
interest and tax. In order to aggregate the effective corporate income tax rate to the city level, we alternatively
calculate the weighted average of effective corporate income tax rate for firms established before and after 2002
in a city. The weight is a firm’s added-value.
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extra-budgetary revenue collection of local governments, as described in Hypothesis 3.
The estimation results for the effect of the VFI on local collection of extra-budgetary
revenues are summarized in Table 8. Column (1) reports the results for the use of the ratio of
total extra-budgetary revenues to GDP as the dependent variable, while Columns (2)-(4) do
the same for the ratios of the three specific components of extra-budgetary revenues (i.e.,
industry and transportation sector funds, agriculture sector funds, and land conveyance fees)
to GDP as the dependent variables. Although the estimates of the VFI are negative, they are
highly insignificant in all specifications. These results reinforce our main argument and
confirm the incentive compatibility condition underlining the functioning mechanism of the
VFI.
(Insert Table 8 Here)
5.4. Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we conduct a set of further robustness checks on our baseline results.
To begin with, we re-calculate the instrument (i.e., the change in the predicted school-age
population) using historical data on school-age population in 1989 (instead of 1999) as the
base in order to ensure that we avoid the endogeneity concern. The results are reported in
Panel A of Table 9.35 As shown, the results are quite comparable to the corresponding
baseline ones, confirming our notion that local governments respond to the presence of the
VFI by reducing local revenue collection, particularly by lowering the collection of local
taxes under the direct control of local governments.
(Insert Table 9 Here)
Second, we check whether our findings might be driven by the measurements of the VFI.
As we highlighted in subsection 4.2, transfer dependency, defined as the ratio of
intergovernmental transfers received from the upper-level governments to local government
expenditures, is another indicator of VFI that has been widely used in the literature (e.g., De
Mello, 2000; Bird and Smart, 2002; Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2002). Thus, we repeat the
empirical tests for Hypotheses 1-3 using this new measure of the VFI and report the
corresponding results in Panel B of Table 9. Largely consistent to our previous main results,
35

In this section, we only report the results for aggregated dependent variables, including total fiscal revenue,
total tax revenue, local tax revenue, shared tax revenue, and extra-budgetary revenues. The results for specific
individual tax are presented in Appendix from Table B1 to Table B4.
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we find that the transfer dependency has a negative and statistically significant effect on the
ratio of total fiscal revenues to GDP, ratio of total tax revenues to GDP, and ratio of local
taxes to GDP. And simultaneously, it has no significant impact on the ratio of shared taxes to
GDP and the ratio of extra-budgetary revenues to GDP. The magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients for transfer dependency are only slightly smaller than those obtained using VFI
as the explanatory variable. This may simply reflect the fact that fiscal transfers are close to,
but do not fully capture, the actual fiscal gap of local governments due to the existence of the
net remittances and deficits.
Third, some might be concerned about the needs for using GDP as a general reference for
revenue collection, and the aforementioned results might be confounded by the potential
effect of the VFI on GDP (the denominator) rather than actual tax revenues collected (the
numerator). To address this concern and as robustness check, we use directly the actual
revenues collected (in logarithm terms) as the dependent variables in our baseline
specification and re-estimate models. The results are presented in Table 10, and they are quite
robust and largely unchanged from those in Tables 5-8, lessening the concern over the
measures of the dependent variables.
(Insert Table 10 Here)
Lastly, given that local officials care about their own political promotion, there may be a
concern that in the presence of VFI, local officials may in turn face stronger incentives to
increase (rather than reduce) their tax effort in order to finance sufficient revenues for
development. In order to deal with this potential confounding factor and to show the
robustness of the results, we further restrict our sample to those cities whose leaders (party
secretaries) are under the age of 53; this age is usually regarded as a threshold of the final
chance for getting promoted to (Chinese) city party secretaries (Yu et al., 2016). If political
promotion concern does matter for local taxing behaviors, we would expect that in the
estimations for this subsample, the negative effects of VFI may be reduced. Our results in
Table 11 indicate that the estimates for VFI in all specifications are very close to what we
obtained in the baseline estimations in terms of both magnitudes and significance level,
suggesting that political promotion incentives might not be a first-order concern in our
analysis of taxing behaviors.
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(Insert Table 11 Here)

6. Conclusions
Since the TSS reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has been characterized by the
marked presence of VFI at the local level, giving rise to the twin common pool and soft
budget constraint problems with the potential of significantly distorting the fiscal discipline
of local governments. Using a large panel dataset at the city level in China for the years
1999-2009, this paper is the first to examine the effects of the VFI on local fiscal discipline in
the context of taxing behaviors, while it explicitly explores the institutional conditions under
which the impact of the VFI may actually take place.
We find that the VFI significantly reduces both the ratio of total fiscal revenues to GDP
and the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP, supporting the prevailing argument that higher
levels of the VFI may induce fiscal indiscipline by reducing tax effort of local governments.
We take advantage of the unique Chinese fiscal institutional framework that assigns the
taxing power for local taxes and shared taxes to two separate authorities (i.e., the local tax
bureau and the central tax bureau, respectively), and we further explore the heterogeneous
effect of the VFI on the revenue collection of local taxes and shared taxes. In doing so, we
clearly identify the importance of local tax autonomy as an institutional backup for the
functioning of the VFI. Specifically, our results reveal that local governments respond to the
presence of the VFI by lowering their tax effort on local taxes, for which they have certain
tax autonomy. However, higher levels of the VFI have no significant impact on the collection
of shared taxes, which in turn come under the direct administration of the central government.
We further show that the indisciplining effect of the VFI does not exist for extra-budgetary
revenues, which in turn, favors the institutional fact that extra-budgetary revenues are not
incentive-compatible to the functioning mechanism of the VFI in China. Our results are
shown to be robust across different specifications, correcting for the endogeneity of the VFI,
and for alternative measures of the VFI.
From a policy perspective, if the continued expansion of the VFI at the local level and the
resulting distorted taxing behaviors of local governments are deemed undesirable by the
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Chinese national authority, then there will be a need to rebalance the expenditure assignments
and revenue assignments to local governments. In theory, either assigning more revenue
sources to local governments or recentralizing some of the existing expenditure
responsibilities to the central government should help in that direction. In practice, since
many social expenditure responsibilities in public welfare, including unemployment
compensation and pensions, have long been wrongly assigned to subnational governments,
especially at the lowest level (Liu et al., 2015), there is plenty of scope for China’s central
government to reassign and centralize those expenditure responsibilities. As the findings of
this paper attest, this type of policy—or providing local governments with greater tax
autonomy—would contribute significantly towards raising the fiscal discipline of local
governments in China.
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Fig. 1. Total fiscal revenue and expenditure, and the VFI of city governments

Fig. 2. The size of extra-budgetary revenue of city governments
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Variables

Obs.

Min.

Max.

Total fiscal revenue (% of GDP)

3,494

5.19

1.93

0.84

23.80

Total tax revenue (% of GDP)

3,469

3.80

1.65

0.34

18.17

Local tax revenue (% of GDP)

2,782

1.92

0.82

0.35

7.52

Business tax revenue (% of GDP)

3,477

1.15

0.67

0.15

6.65

Agriculture tax revenue (% of GDP)

2,797

0.51

0.38

0.01

2.93

Urban infrastructure tax revenue (% of GDP)

2,823

0.30

0.20

0.05

2.39

Shared tax revenue (% of GDP)

3,140

1.53

0.84

0.11

6.65

VAT revenue (% of GDP)

3,477

0.89

0.54

0.07

5.93

Corporate income tax revenue (% of GDP)

3,142

0.41

0.37

0.01

3.48

Personal income tax revenue (% of GDP)

3,475

0.24

0.17

0.02

2.61

Extra-budgetary revenue (% of GDP)

3,308

1.27

1.37

0.04

6.82

Industry and transportation sector fund (% of GDP)

1,822

0.03

0.05

0.00

0.40

Agriculture sector fund (% of GDP)

1,893

0.03

0.04

0.00

0.25

Land conveyance fee (% of GDP)

2,185

0.37

0.42

0.01

2.03

VFI (%)

3,560

51.22

23.10

-46.39

97.46

Log (real GDP per capita)

3,493

9.19

0.79

7.07

12.60

Log (population density)

3,507

5.34

1.36

-0.44

8.45

Share of secondary industry, as % of GDP

3,507

44.73

12.70

8.15

90.97

Share of tertiary sector, as % of GDP

3,467

35.60

7.69

8.50

85.34

Log (cultivation land per capita)

3,321

6.50

0.79

2.76

8.98

FDI/GDP (%)

2,870

2.45

3.56

0.00

51.41

Log (highway)

3,528

8.66

0.78

5.36

10.62

Log (passengers)

2,979

8.37

0.88

4.81

11.89

Number of cities

3,575

13.96

3.89

2

21

Number of counties

3,559

5,73

3.68

0

22

Rural Tax-for-Fee reform

3,452

0.73

0.44

0

1

Fiscally supported population, as % of total population

3,497

3.38

1.15

0.55

12.01

Log (age of the city party secretary)

3,371

3.93

0.09

1.61

4.25

Minority dummy for the city party secretary

3,383

0.92

0.27

0

1

Education of the city party secretary

3,318

4.66

0.82

1

7

Transfer dependency, as % of government expenditure

3,500

49.03

21.40

-7.59

98.80

Natural growth rate of population (‰)

3,283

5.75

3.43

-3.35

20.00

School-age (0-14 years) population in 1999 (10,000 persons)

3,542

83.11

53.28

2.82

277.28
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Mean Std. Dev.

Table 2. Fixed effects estimations: the disciplining effect of the VFI
Dependent variable

Total fiscal revenue (% of GDP)

Total tax revenue (% of GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.103***

-0.120***

-0.121***

(0.014)

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.008)

Economic controls

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Political controls

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R-squared

0.653

0.787

0.792

0.524

0.560

0.562

Observations

3,081

2,559

2,416

3,071

2,552

2,409

VFI

(4)

(5)

-0.036*** -0.035***

(6)
-0.033***

Number of cities
292
266
266
292
266
266
Note: Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita),
FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of
counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the
city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.

Table 3. First-stage estimation results for the IV estimations
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

9.311***

7.432***

7.405***

9.339***

7.437***

7.399***

(2.489)

(2.300)

(2.329)

(2.486)

(2.302)

(2.331)

Economic controls

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Political controls

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

13.99

10.44

10.11

14.11

10.44

10.08

Observations

3,077

2,559

2,415

3,067

2,552

2,408

Change in the predicted
school-age population (IV)

Number of cities
288
266
265
288
266
265
Note: The dependent variable in the first-stage regressions is the VFI. The dependent variable in the
second-stage regressions in Columns (1)-(3) is Total fiscal revenue (% of GDP), while in Columns (4)-(6) it
is Total tax revenue (% of GDP). Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log
(population density), Share of secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log
(cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number
of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary),
Square of Log (age of the city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of
the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4. IV validity test
Dependent variable

Total fiscal revenue (% of GDP)

Total tax revenue (% of GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.102***

-0.120***

-0.121***

(0.014)

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.008)

-0.320

0.027

0.111

-0.641

-0.382

-0.348

(0.548)

(0.236)

(0.246)

(0.461)

(0.245)

(0.262)

Economic controls

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Political controls

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R-squared

0.654

0.787

0.792

0.526

0.561

0.562

Observations

3,081

2,559

2,416

3,071

2,552

2,409

292

266

266

292

266

266

VFI

Change in the predicted
school-age population (IV)

Number of cities

(4)

(5)

-0.035*** -0.034***

(6)
-0.032***

Note: Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita),
FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of
counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the
city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.

Table 5. IV estimations: the disciplining effect of the VFI
Dependent variable

Total fiscal revenue (% of GDP)

Total tax revenue (% of GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.137**

-0.116***

-0.106***

-0.104**

-0.086***

-0.079***

(0.055)

(0.025)

(0.026)

(0.048)

(0.027)

(0.028)

Economic controls

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Political controls

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

13.99

10.44

10.11

14.11

10.44

10.08

R-squared

0.386

0.633

0.629

-0.230

-0.066

-0.043

Observations

3,077

2,559

2,415

3,067

2,552

2,408

VFI

Number of cities
292
266
266
292
266
266
Note: Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita),
FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of
counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the
city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
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Table 6. IV estimations: the effect of the VFI on local taxes
Dependent variable

Local tax

Business tax

Urban

Agriculture

revenue (%

revenue (% of

infrastructure tax

tax revenue

of GDP)

GDP)

revenue (% of GDP)

(% of GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.047***

-0.003

-0.007**

-0.040***

(0.014)

(0.011)

(0.004)

(0.010)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

9.80

10.12

10.96

9.98

R-squared

-0.110

0.187

-0.024

-0.495

Observations

1,974

2,414

1,989

1,982

VFI

Number of cities
265
265
265
265
Note: Given data availability, the year coverage for the business tax is 1999-2009, and the year coverage for
the urban infrastructure tax and the agriculture tax is 1999-2007. Economic control variables include Log
(real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscall y
supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural
Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of
the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party
secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 7. IV estimations: the effect of the VFI on shared taxes
Dependent variable

Shared tax

VAT

Corporate

Effective corporate income

revenue

revenue (%

income tax

tax rate (%)

(% of

of GDP)

revenue (% of

Firms

Firms

GDP)

established

established

before 2002

after 2002

GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.004

-0.003

0.005

-0.462†

-0.047

(0.013)

(0.011)

(0.008)

(0.304)

(0.426)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

12.27

10.12

12.60

11.00

8.48

R-squared

0.125

0.110

-0.065

-0.110

0.016

Observations

2,242

2,414

2,243

1,960

1,401

265

265

265

265

260

VFI

Number of cities

Note: Given data availability, the year coverage for the VAT is 1999-2009, and the year coverage for the
corporate income tax is 2000-2009. The dependent variables in Columns (4) and (5) are the weighted
effective corporate income tax rate at prefecture-city level for firms who were established before and after
2002, respectively. Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density),
Share of secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per
capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and
Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log
(age of the city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party
secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. † represents significance at the 10% level
under a one-tail test.
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Table 8. IV estimations: the effect of the VFI on extra-budgetary revenues
Dependent variable

Extra-budge

Industry and

Agriculture

Land

tary revenue

transportation

sector fund

conveyance fee

(% of GDP)

sector fund (% of

(% of GDP)

(% of GDP)

GDP)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.042

0.002

0.000

-0.015

(0.033)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.015)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

15.78

4.93

7.00

17.83

R-squared

-0.015

-0.048

0.027

-0.044

Observations

2,336

1,365

1,408

1,606

265

244

241

262

VFI

Number of cities

Notes: Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita),
FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of
counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the
city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
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Table 9. Robustness checks: alternative measures of the instrument and the VFI
Dependent variable

Total fiscal

Total tax

Local tax

Shared tax

Extra-budge

revenue (%

revenue (%

revenue (%

revenue (%

tary revenue

of GDP)

of GDP)

of GDP)

of GDP)

(% of GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.139***

-0.091***

-0.055***

0.005

-0.047

(0.033)

(0.030)

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.041)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

8.47

8.37

9.73

8.75

11.41

R-squared

0.631

-0.129

-0.284

0.038

-0.041

Observations

2,325

2,318

1,899

2,158

2,246

255

255

255

255

255

Panel A: Alternative measure of the instrument
VFI

Number of cities

Panel B: Transfer dependency as an alternative measure of the VFI
Transfer dependency

-0.099***

-0.071**

-0.050***

-0.002

-0.047

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.015)

(0.013)

(0.030)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

11.75

11.83

10.49

13.67

20.88

R-squared

0.146

0.093

-0.033

0.108

0.078

Observations

2,386

2,379

1,952

2,216

2,308

Number of cities
264
264
263
264
264
Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Alternative measure of the
instrument (i.e., the change in the predicted school-age population) is calculated by using the 1989
school-age population as the base. Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log
(population density), Share of secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log
(cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number
of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary),
Square of Log (age of the city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education
of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 10. Robustness check: alternative measures of dependent variables
Dependent variable

Log(total

Log(total tax

Log(local

Log(shared

Log(extra-

fiscal

revenue)

tax revenue)

tax

budgetary

revenue)

revenue)

revenue)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.020***

-0.019***

-0.028***

0.001

-0.003

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.011)

(0.021)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

10.11

10.08

9.800

12.27

15.78

R-squared

0.745

0.349

0.227

0.171

0.163

Observations

2,415

2,408

1,974

2,242

2,336

VFI

Number of cities
265
265
265
265
265
Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Economic control variables include
Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector,
Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers),
Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log
(age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city
party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 11. Robustness check: subsample with city leader under 53 years old
Dependent variable

Total fiscal

Total tax

Local tax

Shared tax

Extra-budge

revenue (%

revenue (%

revenue (%

revenue (%

tary revenue

of GDP)

of GDP)

of GDP)

of GDP)

(% of GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.102***

-0.097***

-0.051***

-0.009

-0.022

(0.021)

(0.027)

(0.013)

(0.011)

(0.029)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

12.14

12.06

10.67

13.68

22.11

R-squared

0.677

-0.217

-0.127

0.178

0.109

Observations

1,716

1,710

1,394

1,603

1,659

VFI

Number of cities
190
190
190
190
190
Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Economic control variables include
Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector,
Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers),
Rural Tax-for-Fee reform, Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log
(age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary), Minority dummy for the city
party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Appendix
Table A. Variable description and data source
Variables

Definition

Source

Total fiscal revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of total fiscal revenues to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Total tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of total tax revenues to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Local tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of local tax revenues to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Business tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of business tax revenue to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Agriculture tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of agriculture tax revenue to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Urban infrastructure tax revenue (% of

Ratio of urban infrastructure tax revenue to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Shared tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of shared tax revenues to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

VAT revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of value-added tax revenue to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Corporate income tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of corporate income tax revenue to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Personal income tax revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of personal income tax revenue to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Extra-budgetary revenue (% of GDP)

Ratio of total extra-budgetary revenues to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Industry and transportation sector fund (% of

Ratio of industry and transportation sector fund to

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

GDP)

GDP

Education sector fund (% of GDP)

Ratio of education sector fund to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Agriculture sector fund (% of GDP)

Ratio of agriculture sector fund to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Land conveyance fee (% of GDP)

Ratio of land conveyance fee GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

VFI (%)

Ratio of the difference of a city’s total fiscal

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

GDP)

expenditures and revenues to its total fiscal
expenditures
Log (real GDP per capita)

Log of real GDP per capita

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy

Log (population density)

Total population divided by the area (log)

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy
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Share of secondary sector

Ratio of value-added of secondary sector to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Share of tertiary sector

Ratio of value-added of tertiary sector to GDP

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Log (cultivation land per capita)

Log of cultivation land per capita

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy

FDI/GDP (%)

Ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy

Log (highway)

Log of the length of highways

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy

Log (passengers)

Log of the total number of annual passengers

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy

Number of cities

The number of cities in a province

China Statistical Yearbook

Number of counties

The number of counties in a city

China Statistical Yearbook

Rural Tax-for-Fee reform

=1 if the city has implement the rural Tax-for-Fee

Official documents from provincial governments

reform
Fiscally supported population

Ratio of fiscally supported population to total

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

population
Log(age of the city party secretary)

Log of the age of the party secretary of the city

Public information from the prefecture-city
government’s bulletins

Minority dummy for the city party secretary
Education of the city party secretary

=1 if the party secretary of the city is from ethnic

Public information from the prefecture-city

minorities

government’s bulletins

The level of the education of the party secretary of the

Public information from the prefecture-city

city. 1:technical secondary school; 2: high school; 3:

government’s bulletins

junior college; 4: bachelor degree; 5: master degree; 6:
doctorate; 7: post-doc.
Transfer dependency (%)

Ratio of total transfers to total fiscal expenditures

Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics

Natural growth rate of population

Natural population growth rate (‰)

China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy

School-age population

School-age (0-14 years) population in 1999 (10,000

Provincial Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census

persons)
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Table B1. Robustness checks: alternative measures of the instrument
Dependent variable

Local tax revenue

Shared tax revenue

Extra-budgetary revenue

Business tax

Urban

Agriculture

VAT

Corporate

Industry and

Agriculture

Land

revenue (%

infrastructure

tax revenue

revenue (%

income tax

transportation

sector fund

conveyance

of GDP)

tax revenue

(% of GDP)

of GDP)

revenue (%

sector fund

(% of GDP)

fee (% of

of GDP)

(% of GDP)

(% of GDP)

GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.000

-0.010**

-0.051***

0.004

0.007

0.004

-0.000

-0.011

(0.011)

(0.004)

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.009)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.015)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

8.47

11.22

9.88

8.47

8.89

3.91

5.30

17.27

R-squared

0.171

-0.132

-1.142

0.035

-0.121

-0.473

0.047

-0.007

Observations

2,324

1,914

1,907

2,324

2,159

1,314

1,351

1,546

255

255

255

255

255

234

231

252

VFI

Number of cities

Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Alternative measure of the instrument (i.e., the change in the predicted school -age population) is
calculated by using the 1989 school-age population as the base. Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of secondary
sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), L og(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee reform,
Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary), Minority
dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table B2. Robustness checks: alternative measures of the VFI
Dependent variable

Local tax revenue

Shared tax revenue

Extra-budgetary revenue

Business tax

Urban

Agriculture

VAT

Corporate

Industry and

Agriculture

Land

revenue (%

infrastructure

tax revenue

revenue (%

income tax

transportation

sector fund

conveyance

of GDP)

tax revenue

(% of GDP)

of GDP)

revenue (%

sector fund

(% of GDP)

fee (% of

of GDP)

(% of GDP)

(% of GDP)

GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.001

-0.008**

-0.045***

-0.001

0.004

0.002

0.000

-0.019

(0.011)

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.008)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.019)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

11.75

11.79

10.13

11.75

14.24

5.51

8.25

20.20

R-squared

0.168

0.004

-0.495

0.106

-0.039

-0.099

0.032

-0.025

Observations

2,385

1,967

1,959

2,385

2,217

1,352

1,395

1,590

264

263

263

264

264

243

240

260

Transfer dependency

Number of cities

Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax -for-Fee
reform, Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary),
Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table B3. Robustness check: subsample with city leader under 53 years old
Dependent variable

Local tax revenue

Shared tax revenue

Extra-budgetary revenue

Business tax

Urban

Agriculture

VAT

Corporate

Industry and

Agriculture

Land

revenue (%

infrastructure

tax revenue

revenue (%

income tax

transportation

sector fund

conveyance

of GDP)

tax revenue

(% of GDP)

of GDP)

revenue (%

sector fund

(% of GDP)

fee (% of

of GDP)

(% of GDP)

(% of GDP)

GDP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.004

-0.006**

-0.044***

-0.005

0.001

0.001

0.001

-0.011

(0.009)

(0.003)

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.007)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.013)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

12.15

10.73

10.29

12.15

13.68

9.68

13.51

23.76

R-squared

0.224

0.035

-0.631

0.145

0.042

-0.018

-0.022

-0.016

Observations

1,715

1,402

1,402

1,715

1,603

964

993

1,124

190

190

190

190

190

175

173

188

VFI

Number of cities

Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee
reform, Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary),
Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table B4. Robustness check: alternative measure of dependent variables
Dependent variable

Local tax revenue

Shared tax revenue

Extra-budgetary revenue

Log(business

Log(urban

Log(agriculture

Log(VAT

Log(corporate

Log(industry

Log(agriculture

Log(land

tax revenue)

infrastructure

tax revenue)

revenue)

income tax

and

sector fund)

conveyance

revenue)

transportation

tax revenue)

fee)

sector fund)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.007

-0.016*

-0.060***

0.000

0.001

-0.007

-0.010

-0.012

(0.009)

(0.008)

(0.021)

(0.012)

(0.023)

(0.049)

(0.046)

(0.025)

Economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Political controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province × Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

IV first stage F-stat

10.12

10.96

9.975

10.12

12.60

4.932

6.997

17.83

R-squared

0.319

0.085

0.028

0.241

0.086

0.048

0.044

-0.002

Observations

2,414

1,989

1,982

2,414

2,243

1,365

1,408

1,606

265

265

265

265

265

244

241

262

VFI

Number of cities

Note: Instrumental variable estimations are employed in the estimations. Economic control variables include Log (real GDP per capita), Log (population density), Share of
secondary sector, Share of tertiary sector, Fiscally supported population, Log (cultivation land per capita), FDI/GDP, Log (highway), Log(passengers), Rural Tax-for-Fee
reform, Number of cities, and Number of counties. Political control variables include Log (age of the city party secretary), Square of Log (age of the city party secretary),
Minority dummy for the city party secretary, and Education of the city party secretary. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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